

## ABSTRACTS

### SPECULATIVE THINKING AND THE “WHY-IS-IT” or THE GROUND

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The paper presents the concept of speculative thinking and its main tool, the “why-is-it” or the ground. Following a historical analysis that starts with Aristotle and Plotinus and reaches Hegel and nowadays philosophical debates onto the matter, the author separates this type of thinking that relies on reproduction forms, from the understanding – which uses models as forms – and reason – which deals with reflective forms. The main issues the present paper touches are, among others: ontic reference of speculative thinking, mental processes of speculative thinking and its noetic forms, speculative super-categories, dialectical-speculative schemes, categorial language of speculative thinking and the relevance of this faculty of thought for the general theory of knowledge

**Key-terms:** speculative thinking, super-categories, archeotomy, dialectical-speculative systems, ground, Subsistence, Transcendence, Christian religion.

### ON THE NORMATIVITY OF LOGIC

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Modal and normative concepts are plenitudinous. It is quite reasonable, then, that this abundance raise the legitimate question: how much real diversity are we really having here? Are all those modal and normative concepts independent from each other or they may be reducible to just one kind or to very few kinds of primitive modal concepts? And if the latter, are there some irreducible ways in which a truth might be necessary or a connection might hold by necessity?

The leading concept which is constitutive for my position in the paper regarding the normativity of logic is an anti-reductionist stance according to which there are three main forms of necessity, viz. the metaphysical, the natural, and the normative; and each of them is irreducible to the others or to any other form of necessity.

After I assess the intricacies of the exceptionalism vs. anti-exceptionalist debate concerning logic, I argue for an exceptionalist monist stance regarding logic. I conclude that this position fares better with the three forms of necessity, and in particular with the normative necessity, than the rival anti-exceptionalist pluralist stance.

**Key-terms:** normativity, exceptionalism, anti-exceptionalism, logical monism, logical pluralism, Fillipo Ferrari, Kit Fine, Sebastiano Moruzzi, Florian Steiberger.

## HERMES' LOGIC – A MODEL OF SPECULATIVE LOGIC

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The paper is an attempt to give Noica's logic its rightfully owned place among other logics and to initiate a debate regarding the speculative meaning of its main concepts: holomer, krinamen, synaethism. Following these concepts, the structure of this logic – individual-determinations-general, i. e. IDG – appears as an alternative to Hegelian speculative logic.

**Key-terms:** speculative logic, holomer, krinamen, synaethism, Hermes' logic

## THE ROLE OF DIALECTICAL LOGIC WITHIN THE ANALYSIS OF THE CONCEPTS OF ORTHODOX DOGMATIC THEOLOGY

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The problem of a rigorous, coherent and especially non-contradictory analysis of the central concepts of Orthodox dogmatic theology can be realized only if one takes into account the correct application of this type of thinking on this semantic material which is most appropriate to decipher their authentic meaning. Of the three types of thinking: intellectual, rational and speculative - which correspond to three distinct types of logic: symbolic-mathematical logic, classical-traditional logic and dialectical-speculative logic, only dialectical-speculative logic is suitable, by its nature, for application in his analysis of the dogmatic concepts - the nature of which is speculative - of Orthodox theology. Therefore, solving the problem - seemingly unsolvable - of applying the principles of classical logic, especially that of identity and non-contradiction, is no longer a terminus for dialectical-speculative logic, which has as its own field of research such antinomic realities, and seemingly paradoxical.

**Key-terms:** logic, speculative, orthodox dogmatic theology, dialectic, semantics, antinomy

## DESCRIPTIONS

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Gottlob Frege has shown there are two parameters of a name, Sinn and Bedeutung. If the names were characterized only through one parameter, then we could not explain the distinction between the identity and the synonymy propositions. At his turn, Rudolf Carnap introduced the distinction between intension and extension of an expression. Using this criterion, there can be

distinguished three types of expressions: a) names – they have a constant extension and a dynamic intension; b) terms – their intension is constant and the extension is variable; c) descriptions – both intension and extension are constant parameters. Bertrand Russell used descriptions to solve some well-known paradoxes, proving that they play an important logical or linguistic role. This paper emphasizes the main properties of descriptions and some of their logical peculiarities.

**Key-terms:** descriptions, intension, extension, sorites

## GENERALITY AND INDUCTION IN WITTGENSTEIN'S PHILOSOPHY OF MATHEMATICS

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Wittgenstein has always been preoccupied with the organization of totalities (sets functions, numbers, propositions, forms of language, etc.) and criticized their foundation through extensionalist methods. In this article I highlight Wittgenstein's intentionalist conception of totalities, the mode of operation and the limits of application of the process of mathematical induction. Depending on their type and approach, totalities correspond to general forms (in logic and mathematics) and rules (in the field of language in general). Induction appears as a compromise of expressing a form of totality through a form of generality, more precisely the induction represents the generality. In the case of mathematical induction, I highlight Wittgenstein's problematic structure and I reconstruct the procedure per se. The vicious circle illustrated by the philosopher is that the process of induction is based on a general form of the proposition whose truth must be proved precisely by induction. Deeper, the vicious circle is in the definition of natural numbers that contains the process of induction, and the induction itself is based on the properties of natural numbers as they are given in Peano-type extensionalist theories. The conclusion is that the induction process is applicable to finite fields, that Wittgenstein's interpretation is a constructivist one that does not change mathematical practice, briefly, that mathematics works on the basis of evidence, but evidence is not based on evidence.

**Key-terms:** totality, generality, rule, proof by induction, truth, intentional, recursive functions, Skolem's demonstration through recursivity

## INDUCTIVE METHOD IN RHETORIC AND CRITICAL THINKING

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The paper presents a series of inductive argumentation techniques from rhetoric and critical thinking, the goal being to underline the way the two sciences have evolved faced to classical logic, according to their claim to be different from this one in rhetoric, after marking Aristotle's contribution, we have chosen, for our goal, some argumentation techniques advanced by the new rhetoric, which rely upon the structure of the real (causal binding, pragmatic argument, means-goal argumentation, authority argument), and techniques of founding the structure of the real (foundation by means of particular case, analogy, metaphor), co-joined with occasional logical difficulties. In critical thinking, we underlined inductive argumentation techniques like generalization, analogy,

surveys, causal argument, necessary conditions and sufficient conditions, inference through the best explanation, together with some possible errors of argumentation.

**Key-terms:** inductive argumentation, logic, rhetoric, critical thinking

**A PRESENTATION OF FRANZ BRENTANO'S LOGICAL INNOVATIONS IN COURSES HELD BY NAE IONESCU, NICOLAE BAGDASAR, AND MIRCEA FLORIAN AT THE FACULTY OF PHILOSOPHY AND LETTERS IN BUCHAREST**

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Franz Brentano's logical innovations have earned a well-deserved place in the history of logic, although they are not unanimously recognized.

At the Faculty of Philosophy and Letters from the University of Bucharest, his logical conceptions were made known in the first part of the twentieth century through the lectures of professors Nae Ionescu, Nicolae Bagdasar and Mircea Florian. Their knowledge came both from readings and from direct contact with some of Brentano's students, such as Edmund Husserl and Carl Stumpf, during their studies abroad (Göttingen, Berlin).

This article aims to bring to attention their presentations (little known because some of their courses are kept only in lithographic form), tempering, in some places, their critical advance. I emphasized the continuity of their ideas as well as their chronological consecution, showing that, in the end, they managed to provide a comprehensive picture of the sources, content and influences of Brentano's conceptions in the field of logic and highlight problems that are still widely discussed today.

**Key-terms:** Brentano's logic, existential judgments, affirmation and negation, the signification of copula, history of logic, Romanian philosophy.

**THE RELATIONSHIP OF BELONGING AND SOME ASSOCIATED INFERENCES**

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The present paper aims to focus on the relationship of belonging. It starts from noticing this relation is not a truth function although is reducible to one them, namely to the conjunction one. This way it becomes part of a calculus. In a previous article we distinguished on truth function table of bivalent classical logic two kinds of truth functions:  $\psi$  function and  $\varphi$ -function.  $\psi$  function have premises and sub-contraries truth functions. Unlike these,  $\varphi$ -function have conclusions and contraries truth functions. Conjunction is of the second kind. As the belonging relationship is reducible to the conjunction, it has exactly the same characteristics as a  $\varphi$ -function, in particular of the conjunction. We tried to develop inference schemes based on (classical) transitivity, and the paper is composed of a few ways of developing such schemes.

**Key-terms:** relationship of belonging, truth function,  $\varphi$ -function, conjunction, disjunction, transitivity, contrariety

## THEOPHILUS CORYDALEUS' COMMENTARY TO ARISTOTLE'S PHYSICS (I)

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The paper presents the first introductory and preparing chapters which open the Greek language interpretation of the last important Aristotelian commentator, Theophilus Corydaleuus, to Aristotle's *Physica*; this interpretation was published only once, in Venice, in 1779 under the title *Cursuri introductive la Fizica lui Aristotel* [Introductory Lectures into Aristotle's *Physics*].

**Key-terms:** physics, science, philosophy, theory, praxis.

## THE LOGICAL EXPANSION. THE LOGICAL INITIATION OF THINKING (III)

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The circle of thinking never closes. It is continuously reinitiated towards obtaining the truth. Thinking never stops at the first setting up of the general, of the law. It anticipates every time that the obtained law is a partial one, that the road to truth is an asymptotic one. Because this road is filled in with errors, that can block the access to the general, if within all couples, made up of an individual and a general, there would not be the principle of tolerance to errors which generate imperfections within nature, within the spheres of life (be they cellular, economic or cultural), within the social or within the order of knowledge. Without tolerance the system is blocked. With a too weak tolerance, it becomes entropic. The systems that survive best are those which are not too precisely tuned up.

**Key-terms:** tolerance for errors, mathematical principles, dynamic principles, causation-function-system super-category,