

# **ESTHÉTIQUE ET PSYCHO-ANALYSE. LA RÉPONSE DU JEUNE FICHTE À SCHILLER CONCERNANT L'ÉDUCATION**

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**Abstract.** Our interpretation of Fichte's Letters on aesthetics aims to underline the role of the therapeutic-as-dialog interaction that Fichte establishes in the first letter, in order to understand the theory of drives. Our thesis is that the inner sense of pulsionality can be awoken by a reflection on the sense of the self-activity. Beyond the mirror that the Artist represents, he allows each self to face its own capacity to awaken. The point is to convoke an affect of appeal, which constitutes, in each self, a primary drive that bears relation to the others.

## **SCEPTICISME, DOGMATISME, CRITICISME :**

### **FICHTE ET SCHELLING AVANT 1800**

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**Abstract.** In this study I mean to follow the fate of the dogmatism in the german philosophy from Kant to Schelling, in the years 1794-1799. First, I underline the fact that dogmatism and scepticism are still topical in these years in spite of the kantian criticism. Secondly, I show that the first texts of Fichte refuse the spectre of the scepticism in Maimon and the risk of the dogmatism in Reinhold. Thirdly, I examine the way in which Fichte shows the superiority of the criticism compared to the dogmatism. Fourthly, I underline the reticence of the first Schelling in the face of the criticism. And finally, I show the transfer that Schelling makes from the opposition between dogmatism and scepticism to the opposition between dogmatism and criticism

## **D'UNE ÉTHIQUE DE SOI.**

### **L'ASCÉTIQUE COMME SUPPLÉMENT DE LA MORALE SELON FICHTE**

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**Abstract** : This study of the conferences entitled *Ascetik als Anhang zur Moral* tries to show the importance of the empirical mediations for the constitution of a system of ethics. The philosophical ascetics such as Fichte describes it is an ethics of the self which differs from what Michel Foucault theorized under this name. It is in fact more than a game with itself or a stylization of existence : this *Ascetik* is an effort to make tangible the overtaking of the contradictions of the empirical I, through a new practice of the anamnesis and an real exercise of freedom.

### **FICHTE. LE STATUT DE L'A POSTERIORI**

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**Abstract.** Fichte's conception of *a posteriori* makes sense according to his late theory of reflection, absolute reflection. From *Grundlage* (1794), to *Tatsachen des bewusstseins* (1813), *a posteriori* and *a priori* both express phenomenological process of absolute. There are no ontological different worlds. *A posteriori* consists in a poor degree of reflection as historical individual actions seem to prove their lack of lucidity.

### **“PETER DENIES” - THE IMPACT OF LEIBNIZ' CONCEPT OF TIME ON HIS CONCEPTION OF HISTORY**

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**Abstract.** Despite Leibniz' obvious and extended preoccupation with history, from the time of his appointment as court historian of the House of Hannover in 1685 until the end of his life, his work as a historian has not yet attracted much attention, compared with other aspects of his work. Even less interest has been shown for his metaphysical foundation of history. This paper aims to exhibit the far-reaching implications of Leibniz's metaphysics of individual substances, as formulated in his *Discourse on Metaphysics* and his *General Inquisitions*, for his understanding of history, thereby including human history as well as the history of nature itself, profane as well as sacred history.

## MC TAGGART'S ERROR: TEMPORAL CHANGE

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**Abstract.** It is argued that McTaggart's crucial premise according to which change is the earmark of the temporal is wrong. An ontological analysis of time and change is offered, which implies that there can be only change in time but no change of time and that the movement of the present is not a genuine change. It is also pointed out that McTaggart's influential distinction between A-series and B-series is based on a misinterpretation of Russell view of time.

## DIE ASYMMETRIE DES INTENTIONALEN BEI BRENTANO

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**Abstract.** This article starts from the twofold description of the intentionality of mental acts offered in Brentano's *Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint* (1874): (I) the mental phenomenon contains an object which exists intentionally, mentally or phenomenally, (II) the mental phenomenon is directed toward an object. Keeping this in mind the article defends the following: (1) that intentional or mental existence of the mental act can easily be interpreted in the traditional key based on Brentano's references to the Aristotelian Scholastic views from intentionality's excerpt from his 1874 book; (2) that the traditional interpretation of the mental act's direction toward an object is not the only one possible, further insight can be gained by taking into account Brentano's analyses of mental acts from the second volume of his *Psychology*; (3) that the direction toward an object can be easily accounted for in case of judgments and emotional phenomena; in case of sensations it is difficult to spell out what such a direction toward implies; and (4) that this difficulty raises the problem of whether or not Brentano's classification of mental acts is asymmetrical; more exactly, while the feature of the intentional existence of the object is to be found in all classes of mental phenomena, the feature of the direction toward an object seems to be missing in the case of the subclass of sensations' presentations.

## FRANZ BRENTANO SUR LE STATUT ONTOLOGIQUE

DES CATEGORIES D'ARISTOTE

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**Abstract:** For Brentano, the ontological status of Aristotle's categories results from their reports to the being in itself and to the individual things. In comparison with the being, categories are universal ways where the being in itself manifests and the first kinds where he shares. In comparison with things, categories are the supreme kinds, which envelop all individuals in their spheres. As effect of their ontological place, categories are the universal predicates for the being, but also for less general kinds, for species and for the individuals. But because the being in itself is genuinely represented by the first substance, and because this one indicates the individual, we can say that the term in comparison with which shows the ontological status of categories is the individual thing, accompanied always by the first substance, as its real conceptual projection on absolute ontological plan.

## LUMIÈRE DE LA GNOSE: CONSIDÉRATIONS SUR L'HISTOIRE DE LA MÉTAPHYSIQUE EUROPÉENNE

ȘTEFAN VIANU

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**Abstract.** The purpose of the present article is to address the issue of meaning in Western metaphysics by departing from its founding text: Aristotle's *Metaphysics*. If an essential text cannot but only be interpreted in the light of one question, our own question will be inspired by the gnostic teachings of *The Tripartite Tractate* where both philosophical and theological thinking get intertwined. In light of this text, it becomes possible that we give a general interpretation of Western metaphysics that is substantially different than the one proposed by Martin Heidegger.

## THOMAS AQUINAS ON BRIDGING THE GAP BETWEEN MIND AND REALITY

ELENA BĂLTUȚĂ

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**Abstract:** The aim of this article is to follow Thomas Aquinas in his attempt to prove that the gap between mind and reality is bridgeable. This whole epistemological puzzle is by no means a new one, but unlike his predecessors who were unable to solve it, Aquinas managed to bridge the epistemological gap by applying the Aristotelian recipe of agent intellect and its act of abstraction, improved by adding the illumination ingredient. The article follows a tripartite configuration: At first Aquinas's arguments for the sources of human cognition and for the impossibility of cognizing particulars are presented, at second the differences between specific objects of cognition are given and at third Aquinas's solution is stated.

## RECOVERING COMMON GROUND: PHILOSOPHICAL RESOURCES FOR THE THIRD MILLENNIUM

JEFFREY K. SOLEAU

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**Abstract:** In *Civilization and Its Discontents*, Sigmund Freud addresses the inherent psychological tension that exists between the instinctual desires of the individual and the demands of civilization. Today, the project of civilization is made more complex by the intermingling of cultures. Given this context, how can globalization occur in a manner that is comparatively peaceful, respectful and creative—rather than violent, dehumanizing, and destructive? Ideas from three twentieth century figures provide a way forward. Martin Heidegger critiques our current technological attitude and suggests an alternate, more essential way of being in the world—dwelling. Mircea Eliade's discussion of traditional cultures with their focus upon the sacred and ontological dimension of life can help scientific, post-modern cultures reconnect with religiously vibrant cultures. Hannah Arendt's description of the 'active life' with its emphasis upon the political arena—where people come together as equals to debate and deliberate—provides a model for cultural dialogue. Heidegger, Eliade, and Arendt, together, provide helpful resources for the challenge of globalization.

#### DANIEL GARBER ON CORPOREAL SUBSTANCES AND MONADS

ADRIAN NIȚĂ

(University of Craiova, Romania; Institute of Philosophy, Bucharest, Romania)

**Abstract.** The paper discuss the account of Daniel Garber on the very important change from 1678/9, when Leibniz rehabilitates the substantial forms and the corporeal substances: in the middle years (late 1670s to the mid- or late 1690s), Leibniz had not yet come upon the monadological metaphysics that will characterize his later years (mid- or late 1690s to his death, 1716). We will present the most important arguments of Garber and finally we will present some critics and objections