TARSKI'S VISION AND OURS

WILFRID HODGES
(Queen Mary, University of London)

Abstract. This paper approaches the history of DLMPS, as well as its future, in terms of structure and scope. The vision of the author emphasizes also the role that DLMPS has to play within the scientific realm. The central critical observation that the word 'methodology' still today plays no role in marking the scope of DLMPS and that for deductive sciences the word is redundant – 'logic' already suffices, should orient the present existence and the activities of this important scientific instance.

FOURTY YEARS SINCE THE FORTH CONGRESS OF LOGIC, METHODOLOGY AND PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE – BUCHAREST, ROMANIA, 1971

ANGELA BOTEZ

(Institute of Philosophy and Psychology „Constantin Rădulescu-Motru", Bucharest)

Abstract. The study presents the forth Congress of Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science that was organized in Bucharest, Romania, 1971. The aim is to present the importance of this Congress of IUHPS and DLMPS, both in Romania and abroad and the Romanian contribution to DLMPS Congresses with special attention to the 1971 Congress, organized in Romania.

PAUL FEYERABEND AND THE FORGOTTEN 'THIRD VIENNA CIRCLE'

FRIEDRICH STADLER

(University of Vienna)

Abstract. The study contradicts the image of Feyerabend as a herald of postmodern "anything goes" and as destroyer of rational philosophy and anarchist, in an approach of the formative intellectual socialization of Feyerabend in Vienna, until his move to England and America. It shows a deep rootedness in the Austrian tradition of philosophy and science, which can be detected up to his return to Europe. At the same time, the text presents a consistent intellectual profile that tracks the empirically oriented complementarity of science and art and science of history and philosophy of science toward an abstract, normative philosophy of science at various levels, with a loose agenda. This is conceived in the form of a historically oriented relativism and aims rather to interpret Feyerabend's contribution as a continuation of the productive approaches spilled into the History and Philosophy of Science since Mach than considering his work a big break or settlement with the philosophy of science, as evidenced also in Feyerabend's notes, in his autobiography.

THE NEW MODE OF KNOWLEDGE PRODUCTION IN THE KNOWLEDGE BASED SOCIETY

CONSTANTIN STOENESCU
(University of Bucharest)

Abstract. Science was traditionally described in disciplinary terms as an objective, disinterested and autonomous activity. Really, the modern science was progressively structured in scientific disciplines, astronomy and physics, first of all, centered on the problem solving process under the supervision of great scientists. But the human society has changed in the meantime and we can assert that we live in present in a new kind of society, namely, knowledge based society. We need to use a new way of thinking about science in order to understand it and to explain what is happening in science and society. Knowledge is produced in a new mode. Science became more centered on problem selected by society, it is more dependent on different contexts of research and it is trans-disciplinary. Science and society are opened one another and debate jointly every step according to accountability standards and quality control criteria. Therefore, because science and society have changed, a new social contract between science and society was socially adopted.

RETHINKING BELIEF REVISION BY TRUTHLIKENESS

ILKKA NIINILUOTO
(University of Helsinki)

Abstract. Belief revision (BR) and truthlikeness (TL) emerged independently as two research programmes in formal methodology in the 1970s. In earlier papers I have tried to show that TL gives reasons for rethinking BR in two respects (Niiniluoto, 1999, 2010, forthcoming). First, TL uses distance measures which allow the extension of BR models from propositional logic to full first-order logic. Secondly, it turns out that AGM expansions and revisions of false belief systems by new true input information may fail to increase truthlikeness. The alternative model of updating by imaging seems promising but leads to other problems.

THE ULTIMATE ARGUMENT AGAINST CONVERGENT REALISM AND STRUCTURAL REALISM: THE IMPASSE OBJECTION

PAUL HOYNINGEN-HUENE

(Leibniz Universität Hannover)

Abstract. There are two assumptions relevant for the sake of argument, conceded to convergent realism. First, a theory of space with a metric can be defined containing the relevant sequence of theories. Second, the convergence of this sequence can be

diagnosed on the basis of a finite number of elements. The impasse objection states that the limit theory may be substantially different from the true theory. This objection also hits structural realists who base their realism on the stability of structure in the sequence.

A SOURCE OF FEYERABEND'S DECISION-BASED EPISTEMOLOGY: HUGO DINGLER'S VOLUNTARISM

DANIEL B. KUBY

(University of Vienna)

Abstract. The aim of our contribution is to highlight a neglected source of Paul Feyerabend's philosophy, namely the work of the – by now – forgotten philosopher of science Hugo Dingler. Dwelling into unpublished archival sources, we show that Feyerabend studied extensively Dingler's work in his youth, as far as to become a "determined Dinglerian" for some time. This background, we argue, is important in order to assess the prominent role which Feyerabend assigns to decisions in settling conventional elements in scientific knowledge, i.e. the voluntarist bent of Feyerabend's Decision Based-Epistemology, as we propose to call it.

DAMASIO, SELF AND CONSCIOUSNESS

GONZALO MUNÉVAR

(Lawrence Technological University)

Abstract: I will argue that Antonio Damasio's theory of consciousness, and particularly that his notion of core consciousness does not square with dreams, locked-in-syndrome, and our normal psychological experience. His connection between consciousness and the self detract from his insights about the self. Where Damasio should find conscious processes, we find unconscious ones instead. Indeed the self, as instantiated in the brain, should do most of its work unconsciously in order to succeed, as evolutionary neuroscience would lead us to expect.

THOMAS KUHN'S *THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS*: INTERPRETATIONS AND DEVELOPMENTS

FRIEDRICH STADLER

(University of Vienna)

Abstract. The symposium provides insights into the wide range of interpretations of Kuhn's classical work, with a focus on the European scene. We consider the spectrum of political interpretations that can be found in the sixties in England, ranging from Kuhn as a conservative advocate of "normal" science to Kuhn as a progressive propagator of revolution in the sciences. In addition we consider naturalist interpretations of Kuhn integrating cognitive psychology in the analysis of science and formalist interpretations as can be found in the German school of structuralism of scientific theories.

CONFRONTING FRENCH ROOTS AND CURRENT HISTORICAL EPISTEMOLOGIES

DAVID RABOUIN

(University of Nancy)

Abstract. In recent years, "Historical Epistemology" has emerged as a convenient label for new ways of bringing history and philosophy of science together. Even if some actors of this trend, like Ian Hacking (and more recently Lorraine Daston), keep a certain distance from the name itself and propose very different ways of undertaking this program, they all make central reference to the French tradition in which the term "historical epistemology" was coined. However, it is very rare that these references go beyond general claims. The aim of our symposium is to assess more precisely the link between these two periods of "historical epistemology".

POINCARÉ, PHILOSOPHER OF SCIENCE: A HISTORICAL AND PHILOSOPHICAL APPROACH

AUGUSTO J. FRANCO DE OLIVEIRA

(University of Lisbon)

Abstract. Henri Poincaré's mathematical work deals with different problems and their interactions. This diversity led Poincaré to a global vision of mathematics allowing

him to tackle the several problems in which he has been interested from different points of view. But, further his many contributions in Mathematics Poincaré was a special sort of genius and the fact that he could make a metareflection on his scientific work arouse a way of thinking which is always difficult to classify. We want to divide our symposium in two main sections in order to broach the issue from two big topics in Poincaré's thinking. That is, on one side the interaction between Physics and Mathematics and some of the diverse implications of this interaction. And, on the other side the topic of intuition and the Philosophy of Mathematics.

A PLURALITY OF CURRENTS IN TODAY'S HISTORICAL EPISTEMOLOGIES

KARINE CHEMLA, KOEN VERMEIR

(University Paris Diderot)

Abstract. Historical epistemology is now again a burgeoning field of study, bringing history and philosophy of science together in new ways, potentially beyond any form of boundary (disciplines, time periods, geographical areas). On the one hand, historians of science understand historical epistemology as both a philosophical underpinning of their work and a heuristic tool. Some of them aim at uncovering the historically situated conditions of a practice of knowledge, of epistemic virtues or of scientists' styles of inquiry. Others study fundamental scientific concepts, which organize knowledge in different historical periods, along with the contingent conditions for their permanence or transformation. On the other hand, philosophers of science interested in historical epistemology develop new theories of concept formation and the naturalisation of epistemology and they think through the philosophical consequences of the social dimensions and historicity of knowledge.

EPISTEMOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF COMMUNICATION

HENRIETA ANIŞOARA ŞERBAN

(Institute of Philosophy and Psychology „Constantin Rădulescu-Motru", Bucharest)

Abstract. The paper emphasizes the fact that contemporary epistemology investigates the border implied by the drastic separation of social context and scientific practice from the perspective of contemporary philosophy of communication. The argument of this article interweaves communicational concepts with epistemological value such as *différance*, episteme, "transversality" and irony in order to set in perspective the social

and situational context and its relevance for the scientific practice.

SOME METHODOLOGICAL ASPECTS TOWARDS AN INTERPRETATION OF KANT'S *CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON*

MARIUS AUGUSTIN DRĂGHICI
(Institute of Philosophy and Psychology „Constantin Rădulescu-Motru", Bucharest)

Abstract. The aim of this article assumes the fowllowing tasks: firstly, it is trying to underline the importance of the historical-exegetical point of view with respect to the problem of the sources and reasons of the well-known changes operated by Kant in the second edition of *Critique*; secondly, it emphasizes an assumed systematic-disciplinary perspective from which is constituted the starting point of the reconstruction approach regarding the Kantian theoretical program, perspective that has the advantage over the first one to have the capacity of building new theoretical reconstructions away from the historical-systematic context; finally, the last task (and the most relevant here) proposes a different perspective from the two which embraceses them alltogether as one as the most qualified overview that, on one hand, can solve the theoretical difficulties of the Kantian program of the *Critique* which the exegesis are dealing with (but not those problems alone) and on the other hand is able to offer the possibility of new theoretical-sistematic openings of the *Critique* to present.

SCIENTIFIC UNDERSTANDING – VIEWS FROM PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE

RICHARD DAVID-RUS
(Institute of Anthropology of the Romanian Academy)

Abstract. Scientific understanding was a rather neglected topic in philosophy of science, despite its association with the well-known explanation subject. The classical position on explanation considered an approach on understanding to be redundant on one on explanation. Besides, the dominant view promoted by the unificationist approach on explanation conceived understanding as a "global affair", as Friedman called it, of scientific knowledge. The recent developments in philosophy of science redirected the research to more local aspects of science and scientific inquiry. This new context calls for a reconsideration of the possibility of approaching understanding under different perspectives than the old one. I will try to identify some points of this reconsideration using as reference the frame of an influent tendency in today's philosophy of science - the modelistic view.