

THE GOD-WORLD PARADIGM AND THE CONDITIONS OF HUMAN ACTION IN THE *OPUS POSTUMUM*

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Abstract. By examining the „absolute whole”, conceived by Kant for his system of transcendental philosophy, we become aware of the way we act to satisfy the highest point of this system, which is identified with God and man. This is wisdom in the highest degree, which the *Opus Postumum* takes as its target. It was possible thanks to the reorientation of his system from metaphysics to transcendental philosophy itself. Owing to the change in orientation, the three transcendental ideas, which satisfied the critical purpose of metaphysics, have been replaced with the God-world paradigm in order to fulfil the final purpose of his system, namely, to prepare the practical action, initiated in the *Metaphysics of Morals* and accomplished in the *Opus Postumum*.

Key words: God, world, metaphysics, transcendental philosophy, categorical imperative, duty, human action.

A paradigm shift. In his critical period, Kant structured his practical and theoretical philosophy according to three transcendental ideas: God, the immortal soul, and freedom. Representing maximum targets of philosophical inquiry, the outcomes of this structuring started with a relative satisfying of the promise. Firstly, because the **theoretical** investigation concluded that, from the point of view of the object of investigation, the idea, which presented itself as an object of pure understanding, was approachable. However, from the point of view of the subject of investigation, it never did find its adequate expression *in concreto*, because in reality the subject was subordinated to the empirical condition, which caused problems for the concept of a maximum. As a result of the difficulties the theoretical philosophy was confronted, transcendental ideas were transferred to **practical** philosophy, to fulfill its synthesizing role. Here their evolution proved to be more favourable, owing to their relationship with the **highest good**. The outstanding moral purpose, which the highest good is, has the representation of an unconditioned element in common with transcendental ideas; this element is the object of pure practical reason. The practical determination of this idea, by relating it with the realizing subject, leads us to the concept of philosophy, on whose foundation it was conceived. The meaning Kant gave to this concept is very close to the original, formulated in Greek antiquity, namely, to follow the highest good

and the behaviour through which is acquired¹. Following the developing purpose of the highest good, philosophy presents itself as an attitude. From a practical point of view, philosophy is a doctrine on the highest good, from whose pursuit the reason makes the love of wisdom a science, since its object is accomplished in time and goes beyond the limits of phenomenal life. As love of wisdom, it is, simultaneously, love of science, by which the whole speculative knowledge of reason is understood. These two highest intertwining targets – wisdom and science – make philosophy an ideal, which can only be entirely represented in reason, as a result of which, in practice, it is not expected to be found as such. What the human being can do in relation with the highest good is strive towards it, because his/her action conforms as closely as possible to the ideal of wisdom². This purpose, together with the human being's striving, is intended to contribute to the makeup of a "genealogical tree"³ of knowledge, which has to present itself, ultimately, as an "absolute whole"⁴. The paradigm God-world, together with its constituent elements, which are, on the one hand, nature and freedom and, on the other, the subjective of human reason which valorizes them, represents a reduction of this system. It is built up of concepts, based on synthetic *a priori* principles, to be applied to experience. In this way the whole of transcendental philosophy presents itself, rethought in agreement with this paradigm.

How this system is built up identifies with the direction of the highest good, the cultivation of which opens the way not only to philosophy and science but,

¹ Immanuel Kant, *KpV.*, AA, 5: 108.

² This position can be found in Klaus Düsing, "Das Problem des höchsten Gutes in Kants praktisches Philosophie", *Kant-Studien*, 62, no. 1, 1971, pp. 5–42. Düsing summarizes the contribution of antiquity, mainly of Roman Hellenism and stoicism, to the composition of the Kantian moral theory. Together with these influences, those coming from the Christian ethics, philosophically considered, stimulated the Kantian reflection on the highest good, as a principle of morality (12). Geismann affirms that in the Canon of the *Critique of pure reason* Kant held a „pre-critical or semi-critical moral philosophy” (Georg Geisman, "Zur vermeintlichen vorkritischen Moralphilosophie in der Kritik der reinen Vernunft", *Kant-Studien*, 112, no. 2, 2021, pp. 265–298). Here practical freedom is understood as cognized through experience, and Kant not only allows a sensuous incentive for the observance of the moral law, but considers it necessary. Against Kant's theory, Geismann argues that „moral philosophy as such is not addressed in the Canon at all”, which "by no means approves of sensuous incentives with regard to the morally required promotion of the highest good" (p. 265). It will be developed in the second *Critique* and completed in *Opus postumum*, as will be seen in the present text. Kwang-Sae Lee affirms that "at the individual level, the highest good is [...] the synthesis of the intention and the hope of the moral man, at the level of the entire human species it embodies [...] the total mobilization of human history through the cumulative efforts of generations of humanity. And for Kant, moral progress will be made [...] palpably at the collectively human level" (pp. 553–554). "The point of postulating it is to stress and to make possible the idea of endless moral striving of finite rational beings, which is a demand of pure practical reason" (p. 556). (Kwang-Sae Lee, "Some Reflections on the Idea of the Highest Good as a Regulative Idea of Pure Practical Reason", 7. Internationaler Kant-Kongresses, Mainz, 1990, Akten, II, 1.Hrsg. von G. Funke, Bonn, Bouvier Verlag, 1991, pp. 551–561).

³ Imm. Kant, *OP*, AA, 21: 26.

⁴ *Ibidem*.

inevitably, to morality, because, as it is a supreme condition, moral law is included in the concept of the highest good. In this framework, the highest good is the maximum expression of morality. It is found both in the object of pure will and in the concept of pure will, which is necessary to achieve the moral law. Consequently, the highest good is thought of as the whole object of reason, which must be represented as necessary possible, because from the command of pure practical reason we must do our best to achieve the highest good. If the human being is intended to find fulfillment in pursuit of the highest good, it must be acknowledged that the human practical faculties, such as the will and reason, correspond to this purpose. From a theoretical point of view, the highest good is embedded in these practical faculties, as an achievement of moral law; however, practically, is it only possible by the supposition of the **immortality of the soul**, which is conceived as the first transcendental idea. Together with the supposition of the immortal soul one can reach the second transcendental idea: **God**, the foundation of His supposition, as without God the immortal soul would be an empty idea. Additionally, one can access the third transcendental idea: **freedom** (conforming to the critical thinking). In this way we realize that the highest level of the moral good can be achieved only by this triad: the soul aspiring to God, through a relationship maintained by the freedom to accomplish something relative to the divine perfection. This 'something' are moral duties. They are perceived as divine commands as though they came from God and tend to our fellow man, but to satisfy God. To achieve such an important task we must suppose the will, which stimulates the extra-sensible force of freedom and belongs to the soul, with a potential of immortality. However, as an alternative to freedom, the post critical thinking of the *Opus postumum* proposes the **world**, because God is conceived within the limits the knowledge of world offers and builds up a paradigm of interpretation together with it. And by introducing the world in this way, the *Opus postumum* succeeded in reducing the three transcendental ideas to two, a problematic accomplishment, due to the metaphysical task of the immortal soul. Kant simultaneously succeeded in giving his system an orientation from the possibility of the immortal soul to the reality of the world. In this way he rethought the transcendental philosophy, opening up new possibilities for human action. Together with this reorientation, developed in the critical period, the fusion of material side of ideas with the formal side of pure reason from concepts, took place. Pure philosophy has become, through the unification of the two sides of investigation, "a vestibule of science leading to wisdom"⁵. Taking place from science to wisdom, the first stage of the philosophical preamble is the knowledge of totality, which identifies with science; the second stage presents itself as art (in the ancient sense of *techné*, which has been assimilated to the technic-practical reason), and the third stage, which has

⁵ *Ibidem*, 21: 5.

incorporated the first two: wisdom. It has either a top form as *sapientia*, or a preparatory form, as *sophia*, dealing only with the subjectivity of wisdom. From these preparations follow the stages of transcendental philosophy, by which philosophy becomes **possessed**, then gradually appropriated and **known** and, finally, opened up to the possibility of being **wise**⁶. The stages of wisdom deal, at different levels, with the doctrine of God and the world. In the limits of this paradigm, which subsumes the whole transcendental philosophy, will developed knowledge – of God and the world – and human action. The present text is dedicated to the second purpose of this paradigm, which represents the quality of being wise, to which the transcendental philosophy aims: wisdom, which is better valorized by practical action. And, at the same time, it is more representative of the purpose of the *Opus postumum*, to consolidate the formal side of critical philosophy with the material side, coming together with the world, irreducible only to the rationality of the human being who thinks God, and also to his practical attitude against the world.

God and practical reason. The divine being, derived from wisdom, or from a rationality oriented to wisdom, cannot be anything other than the outcome of rational knowledge, and the rational concept of divine being leads us to the concept of person. As a person, God possesses rights, and, as expected, He is not constrained by duties, but he constrains all other rational beings by the commands of duty. Such a being, with personality, free will and unlimited rights, can only be unique. His uniqueness is deduced from the idea that a species of such beings would have identical concepts, and they would not be Gods, but a suite of Gods or idols⁷. The numerical identity, or singularity, that God disposes of is reflected when confessing faith, in the expression: “I believe in God”⁸, whereas the expression “I believe in A God” does not corresponds to the uniqueness of the divine person, indicating the possibility of many such persons. From a unique, divine person, who both addresses human reason and, it is supposed, has control over human reason, it follows that the idea of knowledge and of all human duties are divine commands. The necessary awareness of this unique power, which only

⁶ *Ibidem*, 21: 6.

⁷ “Die Verschiedenen denen man Verehrung widmete wären Götter ihre Verehrung *Aberglaube* u. die *Abgötterey* u. der *Götzendienst teuflisch*”. *OP*, AA, 21: 10.

⁸ Lawrence Pasternak affirms our conviction in the existence of God and the immortality of the soul that they depend upon in their relationship with the highest good: “And belief in the Highest Good and freedom of the will depend upon their relationship to the Fact of Reason. Thus, all the propositions identified by Kant as instances of belief ultimately depend upon the Fact of Reason. It is because of our assent to it that we can legitimately assent to the others. In other words, when we construe our assent to derivative belief narrowly – that is, consider merely the final step that leads towards assent, these beliefs gain their objective validity through their relationship to the Fact of Reason.” (Lawrence Pasternak, “The Development and Scope of Kantian Belief: The Highest Good, the Practical Postulates and the Fact of Reason”, *Kant-Studien*, 102, no. 3, 2011, pp. 290–315, p. 312).

gives the impression that it imposes itself through the imperative⁹ is, in fact, an indicator of human reason, on the way to perfection, as required by the imperative¹⁰. Being invoked a divine being, which requires the maximum from the human being, it follows that a particular duty against God cannot be targeted, but only human duties as a whole. Invoking a particular duty would suppose God as such, independent of his counterpart, the world, which comprises human reason; he could maintain specific relationships with the human being, from case to case. Alternatively, this specification would exceed the frame of the transcendental paradigm. And he would exceed it, because God Himself, as a being, cannot reach human reason and, consequently, addressing human beings on a case-by-case basis would be impossible. What human reason can do is entertain a general relationship and, mainly, pure moral, which leaves the divine nature unfathomable. Being unfathomable, we suppose that God is completely perfect, a supposition beyond which our investigation cannot progress. The supposition of perfection is strengthened by thinking of the highest object of moral-practical reason, the highest good¹¹, which can be realised in the world through the will, supporting the **metaphysics** of reason. The highest good states that in the world, comprised of rational beings, there is a being of moral-practical reason, known by the imperative, stemming from the formula of an unconditioned command of duty (*dictamina rationis stricte obligantis*). To differentiate the steps of ascendancy to the moral good and to God, Kant conceived a division of the rational faculty according to technicality and morality. In this way, technical-practical reason includes everything that pertains to ability and skill: the arts, which favour rules against principles, are situated here. Moral-practical reason is on a higher level than the technical-practical reason, since it is comprised of duties, it acts from principles, most important among them, the principle of the categorical imperative, to consider all duties as divine commands.

⁹ Oliver Dekens states the idea that from the inseparability of ethical from theological follow two simultaneous theses: the first, that the categorical imperative does not suppose a substance, which commands from his highest position, which would be outside of me; and the second, that the imperative must be considered as coming from a being with an irresistible power on all. The first emphasizes the autonomy of the moral, and the second the necessity of a God with an analogical origin as the categorical imperative. (Oliver Dekens, „De Dieu qui vient à l'idée: Note sur la réduction du divin dans l'*Opus Postumum*”, *Les Années 1796–1803. Kant. Opus postumum*, Sous la direction de Ingeborg Schüssler, Paris, Librairie Philosophique J. Vrin, 2001, pp. 233–239, p. 235).

¹⁰ The metaphysical value of the categorical imperative, which lays the “basis of a metaphysics of moral philosophy, deontological, unconditioned of empirical contingencies” is highlighted by Dale Jacques (“Categorical Moral Maxims in Kant’s Categorical Imperative”, *Akten des Siebenten Internationalen Kant-Kongresses*, Kurfürstliches Schloß zu Mainz, 1990, Hrsg. G. Funke, 1991, pp. 313–322). In relation to the will, as a practical reason, it “dictates autonomously the law of reason to himself, the transcendental ground of the free action and moral responsible” (p. 315).

¹¹ *KpV.*, AA, 5: 108: “Sie sucht als reine praktische Vernunft zu dem praktisch Bedingten...die unbedingte Totalität des *Gegenstandes* der reinen praktischen Vernunft, unter dem Namen des **höchsten Gutes**”.

Both are inevitably linked by an idea, according to a principle, having a general direction from the technical to moral, because they represent the same human reason with different possibilities, supporting differentiated tasks. And they are not only linked by an idea, they can intertwine; as a consequence of their intertwining, aspects of the divine being can also be found in the technicality of reason¹². Like the original being, the derived being is defined as a person, with the difference that the original being is **thought** of as a person, together with the attribute of rationality. But the derived being **becomes** a person, by activating the human subject's capacity to be aware of himself. In being aware of itself, the subject constitute itself *a priori* as an object, becoming "a being founder and originator of his own self"¹³ i.e., a person.

God and the world. Being a person and representing the corresponding qualities of a person to the maximum degree, of God it is said, and we must imagine, that He is a being who is capable of everything. From a practical point of view, the maximum power refers to his faculty of will. The proof of this lies in the fact that everything that He commands, as a duty, is the outcome of His maximum will, requesting maximum requirements from the human will as well. It is said, as a consequence, "in relation to which all human duties are, at the same time, his commands"¹⁴. The first connection of this exceptional person to the world and, at the same time, the first proof of his power, is the supreme cause of beings in the world. Being the supreme cause of these beings, He disposes of the mechanisms of their maintenance, their faculties. Through the will, the most important amongst these faculties, the intervention upon the human being can be assured by imposing duty. Through the second connection a circuit is maintained, by which the human being can share in holiness. At the same time, God who, possessing the quality of an exceptional person, does not need to manifest Himself other than by rights, it is said that He is to be "an alive God in the quality of a *person*"¹⁵. He is "alive" as a result of His original relationship with the human being and, reciprocally, the human being attracts holiness from the divine being. The will, which maintains the relationship between the two elements of the paradigm, makes the relationship not objective, situated in things, but subjective, situated in the rational subject, whose rationality models the will. It is a relationship which is established between heterogeneous objects and their efficient causes (*nexu causalis*); between these causes there is also the thinking of the highest, original and derived good. By thinking this maximum of moral thought, the division in God and the world proves to be not analytical or logical, but synthetical, achieved between two elements which are in a real opposition. From this synthetic (*a priori*) unity, reason makes a

¹² *OP*, AA, 21: 12, 15, 19, 21; AA, 22: 48, 49, 60.

¹³ *OP*, AA, 21: 14.

¹⁴ *OP*, AA, 21: 17.

¹⁵ *Ibidem*.

transcendental unity, adapted to the cognitive dowry of the human subject, because only God is expressly endowed with faculties of interaction with the paradigm: to think, to intuit, to perceive and to know from experience. This summing up of cognitive forces serves as an efficient cause in the system of technical-practical and moral-practical reason¹⁶, neither expressly for knowledge, nor for metaphysics (which the formalism of the *Critique of Pure Reason* gave as its purpose), but for *lato sensu* knowledge of transcendental philosophy¹⁷. This new position of metaphysics favored another attempt to pass beyond the critical position, in which a distinction was made between the deist God of transcendental philosophy and the alive God of theism. Kant's position was that of a trenchant deist¹⁸. To support this one he stated:

“Thus the transcendental and single determinate concept of God that merely speculative reason gives us is in the most precise sense **deistic**, i.e. reason does not furnish us with the objective validity of such a concept, but only with the idea of something on which all empirical reality grounds its highest and necessary unity, and which we cannot think except in accordance with the analogy of an actual substance that is the cause of all things according to laws of reason [...] we undertake to think it as a particular object at all [...]”¹⁹.

Therefore, God was something formulated by the speculative reason, on whose empirical reality he must ground its unity. The limits of the critical concept of speculative reason deprived him of objective validity. In contrast to this position, in the *Opus Postumum* God keeps his role of founder of everything existing; at the same time, it is *as if* He is in the world. From this position, He is closer to the human beings, firstly because among them there is the command with universal validity, which is duty. Secondly, He is closer to the human beings because God has assimilated the person of the Son. In the *Religion within the Bounds of Mere Reason*, although the divine being is not said to be “alive”, nevertheless an equivalent is attributed to him, which is “objective reality”, obtained by assimilating the Son as well²⁰. He is found as a prototype in human moral-legislative reason²¹, in the limits of the same deistic concept of the *Critique*.

The being, about whom it is said that he is the supreme cause of the beings in the world, holds a position of perfection. On these grounds – of supremacy and perfection – he is thought to be unconditioned commanding. His qualities place

¹⁶ *OP*, AA, 21: 26.

¹⁷ *Ibidem*.

¹⁸ Imm. Kant, *KrV.*, AA, 3: 661. On the theism expressed in *Opus postumum* see Fr. Marty, “La philosophie transcendantale dans la dernière période”, in *Proceedings of the Eighth International Kant Congress*, Memphis 1995, Vol. I, Part 3, Sections 3M-3S, 4, 5, ed. by Hoke Robinson, Milwaukee, Marquette University Press, 1995, pp. 865–880.

¹⁹ *KrV.*, AA, 3: 703, Imm. Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, translated and edited by Paul Guyer and Allen W. Wood, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1998.

²⁰ Imm. Kant, *Religion*, AA, 6: 60-61.

²¹ AA, 6: 120.

him in a relationship of disjunctive coordination with the world, which includes all created, but imperfect beings, existing outside of himself. However, despite their real imperfections, they are indebted, in general, with the faculty to think of perfection, which is reason. This is an argument in favor of the relationship between the two entities, despite the fact that the world as such cannot enjoy perfection, being an object of imperfection, for which, first of all, the senses are responsible, because the world is principally a world of senses. The two cognitive reference points are similar, as far as both represent a maximum of its kind. Of the unconditioned being it is said that His maximum is given by His degree (*virtualiter*); it is qualitative, because as an object of pure reason one presents oneself only by the quality of reason; reason which, in the unconditioned being, has reached its maximum degree. Of the world it is said, on the contrary, that its maximum is quantitative, given the determined space in which he is enclosed; space which, being the object of senses, can only produce a quantitative determination. Being represented as maximum entities, the both can be associated with infinity; the infinity of the maximum being presents itself as an activity unlimited by forces (because power expresses itself by force), and the infinity of the world presents itself as a mathematical, or dynamical size, of the objects of sense, reducible to the size of the phenomenon in space and time; space and time also being infinite in size.²² However, while we represent the unlimited being as a thing in itself, due to its incognoscibility in principle, we represent the world as a phenomenon, because we can approach it with our faculties of cognition. These are phenomenological indicators, as representations of the human subject; the real situation of both entities in the paradigm is, to the same subject, unknown. Due to the representation of the subject and, at the same time, of the task he/she assumes, it is said that God is subordinated to the world in existence and tied to it in a system, both technical-practical and moral-practical, for which He is recommended by his quality of a person. The subordination of God to the world and not the world to God, is due to the rational-moral nature of the divine being, dependent on the existence of the person in the world, to whom he transmitted rationality. From his subordination through rationality it follows that transcendental philosophy evidences in the concept of God a substance of maximal existence, regarding all active characteristics of a sovereign being; a maximum which, in his case, means the endowment of reality.²³

²² *OP*, AA, 21: 11.

²³ François Marty believes that the passages from the *Opus* on the existence of God are about the “ontological argument”, which does not appear by its name, but results from the approach. Its formula stems from the concept of a thing, as far as it announces the essence itself, it follows the affirmation of the existence. Marty affirms that: “[...] if this formula is of interest and it is received as provocative, it is because the essence usually does not allow the reference to the existence. The essence, with the «intelligible notes» composing it, allows us to grasp the *possibilities* of the thing. It states *what can be thought*, as would be a «rational animal», which defines the man or other habitable worlds in the immensity of the Cosmos. But, what can be thought does not allow, by its simple examination, to conclude the real, on condition to cut out of any contingency.” (François Marty, “L’argument ontologique dans l’*Opus postumum* et l’influence de la *Critique de la Faculté de Jurer* dans l’*Opus postumum*”, in *Kant-Studien*, 83, no. 1, 1992, pp. 50–59, p. 53).

God is independent of all sensible representations, but he is dependent upon pure *a priori* representations of reason. Among these representations is the fact that the exceptional being is aware of his adaptation “to all true purposes of the understanding, faculty of judgment and human reason (*ens summum, summa intelligentia, summum bonum*)”²⁴. These purposes can only be rational, and their truth of a defining rational being follows from where. At the same time, besides rationality and truth, these purposes emphasize the capacity for a relationship with human faculties and the knowledge these faculties produce. Given the human being’s purposes, the exceptional being can entertain an active relationship with all sensible objects, from which it follows that the division in both God and world is maintained by a reciprocal relationship, since the thinking of both components are sovereign. In this sense, if God has knowledge of the world by the rational purposes of this one, it can be inferred that the world, in turn, would know God as a result of the human subject’s reason, placed at the disposal of the world because of his/her faculty of purposes. Given the fact that we are dealing with the subjective penetration of reason, an evaluation of the concept of reason is imposed and the efficiency of this faculty as a cognitive instrument, because, in spite of the relationship between the two elements of the paradigm, and due to its origin in the sovereign object of the moral-practical reason, Kant considers that the sovereign intelligence would need an instrument stronger than the reason, because reason is a faculty of inference, resulting in a mediated judgment. For this inferring function, reason does not achieve more than understanding, which judges mediately²⁵, since the rule, and subordination to the rule, from which the conclusion, does not add anything from itself, being only a transfer of cognition, a reasoning.

To discover the appropriate faculty of the divine being, Kant considered that although the main human faculties provide the possibility to think about divinity, it is supposed that they are not sufficient or proper instruments of divinity. Kant thought that for this purpose a faculty derived from human faculties, but expressly conceived, is necessary. This faculty was formed from the direction of moral-practical reason, by the following reasoning: the divine being, possesor of an exceptional existence, is expressed by inevitable commands. And although the level of the commands is extremely elevated for a being who wants to give a path to sensibility, not only to obey reason, as the human being does, the commands must also be carried out. To make the divine **must** accord with the human **possible**, we should take into consideration the fact that, in the soul of every man (as *mens*, whose theoretical value is stronger than of *anima*) exists the categorical imperative, which is exercised as a force. It should be mentioned that it is not the entire human soul which is assigned to the divine requirement, but only its theoretical side, closer to understanding. *Mens* is the supra faculty, combined from soul and understanding, intended to satisfy the requirement of the divine being, by the commands coming as from her part. The human being, endowed with such a force

²⁴ *OP*, AA, 21: 13.

²⁵ *OP*, AA, 21: 11.

and disposing of the named *mens*, must have the confidence to realize the imperative and to act on it. If the human being does not act, and a rigorous command of duty is violated, the sanction of an inflexible sentence of reason (*dictamina rationis*)²⁶ follows. And what dictates reason is the deprivation of human being of the oposite side of principle, which is the most appreciated sensible incentive, regulated of no principle, but only asked by his own desire. Nevertheless, this one is to be found in the moral sphere, as far as it represents a permanent temptation against the principle. It is happiness. More so than his critical position on empirical happiness, the happiness meets virtue in the concept of the highest good²⁷, by cultivating a moral disposition.²⁸ It follows that the original and universal legislative being of nature and freedom should not only be considered the sovereign being, but also as possessing the highest understanding; understanding which is essentially good, because he judges according to holiness²⁹, viz. the maximum command of the imperative. In this command, the good of the human being is included, and, together with it, moral value. Of such an exceptional being it is stated that only the **idea** of it serves as a proof of its existence.³⁰ Additionally, if the human being disposes of the reason by which s/he thinks the being capable of reaching perfection, then it follows necessarily that such a being exists in his very perfection. This existence resulted from an idea, as the concept of human reason assumes, is different when compared to both the position of the *Critique of Pure Reason* and of the *Religion within the Limits of mere Reason*. By thinking of perfection, the two main faculties, reason and understanding, strenghtened, because

²⁶ *OP*, AA, 21: 13.

²⁷ Steven G. Smith appreciates that the approach of virtue to happiness is “the sign of success of the moral will. Moral value is the value of being happy” (Steven G. Smith, “Worthiness to be Happy and Kant’s Concept of the Highest Good”, in *Kant-Studien*, 75, no. 2, 1984, pp. 168–190, p. 189). Pauline Kleingeld shows that the concept of the highest good is an essential concept of Kant’s moral theory, from the first *Critique* to the writings of the nineties. First, “Kant’s argument for the existence of a duty to promote the highest good seems to depend on the construction of the idea of a moral world”. Second, “even though the concept of happiness can be interpreted as basically consistent, Kant’s thesis that if everyone would act morally this would cause general happiness is questionable, because of the way in which natural circumstances can frustrate morally intended ends. Third, if the duty to promote the highest good is understood as a duty to promote a moral world, the question emerges as to how it would be possible.” Fourth, “the proportionality of happiness to virtue appears to be much less important for a virtuous agent, than Kant makes it out to be” (Pauline Kleingeld, “What do the Virtuous Hope for? Re-reading Kant’s Doctrine of the Highest Good”, in the *Proceedings of the Eighth International Kant Congress*, Memphis 1995, Vol. I, Part 1, Sections 1–2, edited by Hoke Robinson, Milwaukee, Marquette University Press, 1995, pp. 91–112, p. 109).

²⁸ Georg Rompp synthesizes the Kantian representation of happiness as being determined by three essential elements: “Nothing can be given *a priori*, to bring happiness to man; the matter of his happiness is sensible and can be determined only in experience. The form of happiness is nevertheless intellectual and is grounded on the outcomes of the subjective selfactivity.” (Georg Rompp, “Kant’s Ethik als Philosophie des Glücks”, in *Akten des Siebenten Internationalen Kant Kongresses*, Kurfürstliches Schloß zu Mainz, 1990, Hrsg. von G. Funke, Bonn, Bouvier Verlag, 1991, pp. 563–572, pp. 566–567).

²⁹ *OP*, AA, 21: 14.

³⁰ *Ibidem*.

united they are trained to participate in a superior purpose than human purpose, for which they were initially conceived.

The idea which can assign existence, had in itself the force not only to go beyond the limit of the phenomenon, but of approaching the divine being, to give him an image that corresponds to the phenomenal world. As a result of this possibility, Kant attributed to the ideas of the moral-practical reason “driving forces on the nature of man”³¹. Such forces propagate through the imperative, which induces fear in those comprehending divinity, because these forces not only drive, but cause fear, which, in turn, can become a force even towards the good. In this way, God, who imposes duties on us and offers us the satisfaction of their fulfillment, also inspires fear against the violation of duties in us. Wisdom, it is said, stems from the high standards God imposes on man, together with the feelings corresponding to them. It is described as a state of *horror vacui*, by which it is understood the aversion to everything which opposes right and moral-practical reason, through which duties reach us, and disagreement with the requirements of reason; it is understood as “the moral void”. The wisdom intended to fill this gap is completed in the *Opus postumum*, by invoking the Holy Spirit. According to Christian doctrine, he holds a role to undertake, after which he judges, punishes and absolves through the categorical imperative of duty by means of the moral/practical reason³². Invoking the Holy Spirit, as an executive body of divinity, strengthens God’s quality as a spirit. If the Holy Spirit is expressly mentioned in an attempt to recover the Trinity, we can imagine that it is associated to the force by which God acts, and if it is said that the ideas of moral-practical reason are exercised on man as “driving forces”, we can believe that this metaphor was inspired by the Christian role of the Holy Spirit. Owing to the spiritual nature of divine persons, the possibility that the God-world pair be attracted to the empiricism of the world is excluded, and both pass for empirical *correlata*³³; this empirical attraction would cancel the superior force of the idea, having consequences on the imperative and on the connection between the human and the divine. Although we can represent God and, together with Him, the third person of Trinity as a spirit, nevertheless we cannot represent Him by another non-corporeal concept, which is the soul. Firstly, this is because the soul is a **human** faculty, which has determinate cognitive tasks, and an extrahuman soul, of the “soul of the world” kind, as Plato imagined it, is said that to have connected to the world by its representative part, which depends on empirical conditions. In this interpretation – for Kant – the danger would be the descent of the soul to the level of sense objects. In other words, the transcendent concept of God cannot be associated with this kind of soul, because the concept of God is always negative. And although the concept of God and of the personality of such a being does not come from the empirical sphere, he has reality (as the reason). When it is stated that there is a God in the moral-practical reason, that is, in the idea of a relationship of man with right and duty,

³¹ *OP*, AA, 22: 59.

³² *OP*, AA, 22: 60.

³³ *Ibidem*.

this does not mean that God is a being outside of man. If God were outside of man, He could identify with the entire world, or the both God and world would be empirical correlated. God does not identify with the world existent in space and time, nor with the man, in his quality of belonging to the world. However, something of the both are found in the divine being, because in the *Opus* we are met with the expression that God and man form the totality of things³⁴. By this assertion, which opposes the two elements, we must understand both the man designed by his quantum unframed in space-temporality, for which the imperative is valuable, and the man assimilable to the sensible world. In the quantum unframed in space-temporality, freedom is also part; it is not useful for grounding concepts or practical ideas, because freedom does not have the value of a causal principle. From this perspective, if freedom were associated with the principle of causal relationships, then it would pass as an “effect without a cause”³⁵. Therefore, freedom should always be considered as an effect, whose cause can only be the imperative, as “what forces me implacable should be possible to achieve”³⁶. Freedom is included in this possibility of achievement. The property of a rational being to possess the freedom of will in general, which manifests itself as independence against the impulses of nature, cannot be proven directly as a causal principle; it can only be proven indirectly, by its consequences, as far as the consequences contain the ground of the possibility of the categorical imperative. In this regard, the position of the *Opus Postumum* coincides, in general, with the one of the *Critique of Practical Reason*; here, the law of causality through freedom, as a practical pure principle³⁷, followed from the unconditioned practical law, which is also expressed by the imperative³⁸. The difference of this to the critical work

³⁴ *OP*, AA, 22: 60: “Gott u. der Mensch ist das All der Dinge”.

³⁵ *OP*, AA, 21: 16, 25, 26, 32.

³⁶ *OP*, AA, 21: 16.

³⁷ *KpV*, AA, 5: 16.

³⁸ On the basis of the analysis of the moral Kantian theory before the *Opus Postumum*, where freedom and the unconditioned practical law get involved with each other, Vincent M. Cooke affirms that human freedom is required to be reconciled “with another kind of causality, which is the causality of God or of nature” (p. 743). In conclusion, he affirms that “To Kant a metaphysics of creation and participation is missing, as we meet, for example, to Toma d’Aquino which would have justified Kant to place the teleology of man in the context of a general theology of Creation, giving it an ontological criterium for the legislating reason of man, as measured by approximation of the eternal reason of the author of nature [...]” (p. 755). (Vincent M. Cooke, “Kantian Reflections on Freedom”, in *Review of Metaphysics*, 41, no. 164, 1988, pp. 739–758). In this sense, Mary-Barbara Zeldin put this moral maximum in a relationship to the existence of God; because it cannot be imposed to us something which is logic and real impossible. Therefore, “Promotion or fulfillment of *summum bonum* is logic and real possible, if *summum bonum* is logic and real possible”, and “*Summum bonum* is real possible for the understanding of a rational, finite being, only if God exists”; “If we have to do our duty and to promote the *summum bonum*, we should postulate the existence of God. Because we are categorically commanded to do our duty, the postulate is necessary: the belief in the existence of God is a rational belief of a rational, finite being, it is the belief of his practical reason or a moral necessary faith” (Mary Barbara Zeldin, “The Summum Bonum, the Moral Law, and the Existence of God”, in *Kant-Studien*, 62, no. 1, 1971, pp. 43–54, pp. 44–45).

appears together with the present exposition of the concept of God. Given the fact that human beings dispose of this rational cause, which is superior to them, the possibility of freedom for such kind of beings is, therefore, not directly demonstrable. It is, however, said to be achievable only in the concept of God. If we were tempted to invoke the principle of spontaneity, it can be argued that the thinking of a law of spontaneity by freedom would be impossible, on the grounds that every act of freedom would be an effect without a cause³⁹. Indirectly, however, as a consequence of the categorical imperative, which is undeniably true, freedom is acceptable. Since freedom, which free will can dispose of, has only an indirect reality, it is named a fact, which cannot be attributed to the object as a being of nature, but is a causal principle in the world. For this reason, it should be accepted as such, as a “fact”, as something given⁴⁰. Due to the difficulty in explaining

³⁹ This is a specific position of the *Opus postumum*. The critical thinking was using of spontaneity in awareness of our practical freedom. Henry Allison emphasizes that “the reflection on the spontaneity of our practical reason in thinking and action”, and “the highlighting the connection between practical and transcendental freedom” have supported the “introduction of the apparatus of the transcendental idealism” (271, 278). Henry Allison, “Practical and Transcendental Freedom in the *Critique of Pure Reason*”, *Kant-Studien*, 73, no. 3 (1982), 271–290.

⁴⁰ Fr. Marty is of the opinion that not only freedom, but the categorical imperative as well, should be recognized as a “fact of reason” (p. 55). And, as a novelty of the *Opus postumum* it is the increase “in density” of the imperative, from the *Critique of Practical Reason* to the *Critique of Judgment*, because this time “It is located in the register of the divine” (p. 56). At the same time, it no longer expresses, as in the first *Critique* “the inference, illegitimate, from a «posse» to an «esse»” (p. 58). Henry Allison highlights, in the same practical context, another evolution, from the *Grundlegung*, where a transcendental deduction of the moral law and of the categorical imperative appears, on the basis of the supposition of the idea of freedom, while in the *Critique of Practical Reason* the moral law is stated as a “fact of reason” and a basis of the deduction of freedom. “This one – affirms he – suggests a radical overthrow in Kant’s thinking regarding the justification of morality”. It is related to the fact that “The freedom of will and the moral law are reciprocal. Kant affirms it express in the two works; correlatively, he insists that in both, although the moral law (or better the obligation of the moral law for all rational agents) expresses a synthetical *a priori* judgment, it would be analytical, if the freedom of will would be supposed.” (Henry Allison, “Morality and Freedom: Kant’s Reciprocity Thesis”, *The Philosophical Review*, 94, no. 3, 1986, pp. 393–425, p. 394). Lewis White Beck considers that the fact of reason is no more than the legislation of reason itself. He states that: “Wenn ein Wesen glaubt, es gebe eine Verpflichtung, so gibt es für dieses Wesen ein gültiges Gesetz. Die metaphysische Deduktion hat gezeigt, welche Gestalt dieses Gesetz haben muß; es ist das Faktum für die reine Vernunft” (Lewis White Beck, “Kants Kritik der praktischen Vernunft. Ein Kommentar”, ins Deutsche übersetzt von Karl-Heinz Iltling, München, Wilhelm Fink Verlag, 1985, p. 163). Carla Bagnoli affirms that “The fact of reason is not an objective genitive, but an explicative genitive: it does not refer to an object of intellectual intuition, but it is the fact constitutive of the consciousness of the moral law. Respect shows the necessity of practical reason, given the reality of respect. It is not incoherent to think that reason does not produce moral motives. However, the inertia of reason is incompatible with the peculiar conditions of our sensibility. Respect proves that practical reason is not only conceivable, but also a real possibility. This not to say that the fact of reason works as a phenomenological introspective argument for the objectivity of practical reason.” (Carla Bagnoli, “Respect and Obligation. The Scope of Kant’s Constructivism”, in *Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht*, Akten des XI. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, Hrsg. von S. Bacin, A. Ferrarin, C. La Rocca und Margit Ruffing, Berlin, De Gruyter, 2013, pp. 31–40, p. 36).

freedom, other than through its presence, as a fact, on the sentences of the moral-practical reason it is said that they are totally divine (*dictamina sacrosancta*), because they contain the moral imperative and, for this reason, they are the only ones which demonstrate the reality of freedom. And although freedom becomes manifest owing to the divine source of duties, however, the existence of the divine being in substance is not demonstrated by freedom; freedom can procure a relationship to divinity only in the idea. This means that it is not the concept of freedom the basis of concepts of right and duty, but, on the contrary, concepts of right and duty contain the ground of the possibility of the concept of freedom, which is postulated by the categorical imperative. If we wish to put the existence of the imperative up to a causality from freedom, we would see that things are quite the opposite, the imperative leading to the concept of freedom; because “otherwise – affirms Kant – we could not at all guess the possibility of this property of rational beings”⁴¹. The necessity of the imperative results from bringing to light an unmanifest property of the human being, while, at the same time, being necessary to the connection of this one to the superior being. They are both put in contact because, from the imperative we receive maximum commands which, for this reason, we must consider divine (*praecepta inviolabilia*); they do not allow any attenuation, and their transgression produces the judgment of condemnation by man’s own reason (a reason transformed by the divinity of the command). Therefore, the moral-practical reason reveals us, on the one hand, the supersensible object, respectively God as a being of thought and, on the other hand, highlights the object of senses in totality, viz. the world. The two are determined under the logical rapport of identity and diversity, and under the real rapport of action and reaction, concerning the reciprocal causality of subjects. The representations of these ones are ideas, which sustain the synthetical *a priori* laws from concepts, on which transcendental philosophy is grounded. The relationships between these moral concepts present, in the *Opus Postumum*, a similar position to that of the *Critique of Practical Reason*. In this critical work, freedom was also deduced from the moral law⁴², through which an opening to an intelligible world was made. For this deduction another concept of freedom, other than the empirical concept of freedom was necessary, being given that the moral law does not allow for an empirical determining ground. This critical sense of the concept, which saved freedom, consists of attributing the existence of a thing determinable in time, together with the causality, which conforms to the necessity of nature, to the phenomenon and, at the same time, of attributing freedom to the being determinable in time, as a thing

⁴¹ *OP*, AA, 21: 19.

⁴² Gerold Prauss affirms that “Without the moral law, reason could not be practical, because then only sensible inclinations could actually be practical – what is impossible. Kant himself says that a sensible inclination as such could never be but insofar as it is practical, of a rational being which takes it from freedom in his maxim” (Gerold Prauss, “Kants Problem der Einheit theoretischer und praktischer Vernunft”, *Kant-Studien*, 72, no. 3, 1981, pp. 286–303, p. 291).

in itself.⁴³ From here follows the uniqueness of the concept of freedom which, in the moral subject, unites the unconditioned and intelligible with the conditioned and sensible. However, the possibility of freedom and the theoretical, positive representation of this kind of causality, cannot be demonstrated on this way, only its existence in relation to the law is postulated. Likewise, neither can other ideas inaccessible to human understanding, chiefly the highest good, be demonstrated, but they can be postulated, in order to be used and to make the scheme of practical concepts work. If we do not postulate the freedom as unconditioned, we cannot understand why the free will, possessing such an unconditioned freedom, produces *a priori* the highest good, which works as a link to transcendental ideas.

The capacity of freedom to aim at the unconditioned sustains the reality in the idea, on whose basis the recurrent cosmo-theological statement »it is a God«⁴⁴ is formulated. Owing to the capacity of freedom, Kant requests that this statement be “honored and followed”⁴⁵ under a moral-practical relation, as if it were pronounced by the supreme being, because if we do not have freedom, the technical-practical, objective view, would not provide any evidence for the existence of the divine being, since this view cumulates the results of sensibility and understanding. As a rule, it is associated with objectivity, while the moral-practical reason, which disposes of freedom, represents the force of reason tending to ideas, with the help of reasoning. On the basis of this force of reason, Kant asks us to pass from the approachable objectual to the unapproachable non objectual, because reason has a natural tendency of ascedancy to what is non objectual; however, its tendency must be controlled, to avoid false statements. In this sense, Kant affirms that believing or desiring the presence of the supreme being in the phenomenon would be “a fanatical illusion, to take ideas as perceptions”⁴⁶. And although the supreme being cannot appear in phenomenon, effects of this non-phenomenal presence can appear in phenomenon: the categorical imperative, which commands the freedom under the laws of nature, determines such effects in phenomenon. In itself, as if it would come from the unconditioned being, it goes beyond the limit of explainability of the phenomenon, being an indicator of the inexplainability of the non-phenomenon. The imperative, as a non-phenomenal message which represents God, together with the world, as a phenomenal reality, present themselves as two

⁴³ *KpV*, AA, 5: 95. The relationship of reason with freedom, “a relation with an idea” is emphasized by Dieter Henrich in the sense that theoretical reason does not know freedom as an actual state of things. The certainty that it is free precedes any possible cognition, and it would be “meaningless and circular” to claim the reality of freedom. The hypothesis of the freedom of judgment is legitimate, because without it would not be possible the use of reason. (Dieter Henrich, “The Deduction of the Moral Law: The Reason for the Obscurity of the Final Section of Kant’s *Metaphysics of Morals*”, in *Kant’s Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals: Critical Essays*, ed. Paul Guyer, Lanham, Rowman & Littlefield, 1998, pp. 303–341, p. 316).

⁴⁴ *OP*, AA, 21: 4, 13, 17, 20, 21, 23, 25, 30, 33, 37, 87, 91, 92, 144, 146, 147, 149, 151, 152, 153; AA, 22: 51, 52, 60.

⁴⁵ *OP*, AA, 21: 21.

⁴⁶ *Ibidem*.

a priori absolute unities in pure intuition. Considered together and related to a principle within the system, they are not substances as such, but they represent the thought, through which we make ourselves objects from synthetic *a priori* knowledge that stems from concepts, we are thus self-creators of the objects of thought. As far as each of them contains a maximum, something unique can result from them. The uniqueness of the first object manifests himself through the possibility of being designed by freedom; it is a property and a faculty, whose possibility cannot be proved or explained directly, but which can be explained indirectly, by the commands demanded of reason through the categorical imperative, we can take therefore its reality as valuable. We can take it as valuable because the principle of knowing the commands of reason, as human duties, has universal validity, as though the duties come from a supreme legislator, equal in holiness and power.⁴⁷ The commands elevate the thought object to the rank of an unique being. However, in thinking of an unique being, with maximum powers, his **existence** cannot, logically, be considered a being⁴⁸; however, one can think analogically, as if one of such kind would exist, and consequences could then be deduced from this, as a *dictamen rationis*, maintaining a substantial connection with our being. In his quality, as a non-substantial presence, he has the role of an immaterial and intelligent principle, which can be characterized as a spirit (*mens*).

As a supreme principle of the system of pure reason in transcendental philosophy, it marks the opposition between the idea of God, which it represents, and the idea of the world. Being in opposition, neither on the world can be said that it is God, nor can be said that God is a being in the world or above it; but it is stipulated that there are, only on one side, the phenomena of causality, which exist in space and time; and, on the other side there is a construction of thinking, an idea⁴⁹, which passes beyond the limits of phenomena. But united in the paradigm mentioned above, the idea of passing beyond the limit, of “transition”, in terms of the *Opus postumum*, as far as it is proposed to connect physics to metaphysics, has to extend the transition and connect the sensible world with the extra-sensible world, together with its representative being. To discover the optimal means of this transition, Kant explored logical and analogical formulations, within limits of reason; the alternative affirmations of the perfection of the supreme being as generating his existence, together with the impossibility of deducing his existence from thinking

⁴⁷ Luc Langlois considers that “God presents himself from now on less than an extension of ethics, from the view of a final retribution for the moral action, than as «the personal principle of human reason» and as the true «subject of the categorical imperative», emphasizing to the autonomy of will an ideal of personality coming from its own law and it is focused on it.” (Luc Langlois, “De l’autonomie du «Dieu qui est en nous» dans l’*Opus postumum* de Kant”, in *Années 1796–1803: Kant. Opus postumum*, ed. cit., pp. 241–248).

⁴⁸ *OP*, AA, 21: 20.

⁴⁹ Olivier Dekens states that the identification of God with the idea directs him to a “metaphysical atheism”, which does not determine him “to ever asertorically pronounce on his existence or non-existence” (*op. cit.*, p. 239).

of the uniqueness of such a being are of this kind. Likewise, as an alternative there is the temptation of the theism, expressed by the “alive” God, which comes to support his existence, following the perfection with which he is invested, together with the dominant deism of transcendental philosophy.

To give a positive connotation to the deist concept of God, we have the possibility of projecting our expectations of perfection onto him, because this projection returns a strong message to us. This inversion is only possible in the practical domain, a domain of maximum requirements, but always achievable under requirements, where these maximum requirements come from God and the achievement is compatible with the human, which can be further or nearer to the principle or model. From this proceeding, which corresponds to the phenomenological one, in which the paradigm is framed, the world is not known, and the divine being is lesser known still. But through this paradigm, the world begins to dispose of this message of perfection, which can only come from the divine being. Indeed, such commands and interdictions do not stem directly from the divine being, who remains unfathomable (*imperscrutabilis*); but through them, we begin to generate a stronger sense of the principle and, at the same time, we manage to keep ourselves in the human-divine sphere. In view of this extension of practical knowledge we must rely on our rational side, which give us the possibility to enjoy freedom. And although freedom is only postulated, it plays an important role, by which something that goes beyond the mechanism of nature, is solved. In this something is included the concept of duty, which has such a perfect form, that we believe it must have come to us as a divine comand. The concept of duty precedes freedom and offers arguments in favor of the reality of freedom. However, although we can procure some access to the divinity of duty by freedom, we cannot prove the existence of God in substance through freedom. The advantage that the solution of a non-substantial God presents, connected to us through freedom, is that he cannot be a conflicted issue, because God is not an object of conflict (*objectum litis*) outside of the rational subject which conceives of him. God is an idea of pure reason which, in examining its own principles, tries to valorize them, reaching higher and higher. But from the inexistence of conflicting problems, it does not follow that anything regarding the divine being can possibly be affirmed without contradiction; the dispensing of the proof comes from an authority, because in this case, another authority outside of human reason does not exist. This concept, as has been mentioned, is only satisfied by the moral-practical concept, which generates the force of the imperative⁵⁰. Following the imperative, the subject knows

⁵⁰ Kimberly Brewer and Eric Watkins state that: “From a very broad perspective, Kant has articulated his conception on God in such a way that it makes possible not experience, but rather transcendental freedom [...]. Since Kant’s entire critical project is designed to save the possibility of transcendental freedom, it is clear that his metaphysical understanding of God and God’s activity, if it is to be rational, ought to be consistent with it.” (Kimberly Brewer, Eric Watkins, “A Difficulty Still Awaits: Kant, Spinoza and the Threat of Theological Determinism”, in *Kant-Studien*, 103, no. 2, 2012, pp. 163–187, p. 187).

him/herself as a person, and knowledge stems from the moral force that he/she can attract; from this is formed its quantum of holiness. As a consequence of the behavior transformed by the force of the idea in a moral behaviour, Kant states: "I am in the sovereign being. I see myself [...] in God, who in *myself* is a legislator."⁵¹ All commands which connect man with the categorical imperative, and make an absolute duty from pure practical laws, as an inner inexorable obligation, independent of internal or external advantages, are considered holy duties; they pass for commands independent of nature, which command unconditioned. In relation to nature, as an object of the senses, this person holds all the power. Holding all the power, the cause of the world, considered as a person, can pass for the author of the world. As the author of the world, he passes, at the same time, as an active principle, together with the other active principle, the cause of phenomena, the world. Disposing of these active principles, the subject, which has attracted the moral force, can appreciate the principles and can realize that moral good is only the right of men, as an act of the supreme authority and of the ideal person, who exercises it: God. For this reason, among morally good actions (*facta obligatoria*), those which are only practically good should not be listed. Among them, Kant exemplifies benevolence as an action which is considered as moral wrong. Kant states that although it is beneficial to interhuman relationships, it is only a means to purposes of sense objects; being related to the variability of senses, and not to the authority of the moral principle, it cannot be imposed as an obligation. To avoid this usual confusion between what is morally good and what is only practical good, the *Opus Postumum* invites us to prove wisdom, and to progress from the subjective principles of the phenomenon to the objective principle of experience. Additionally, it specifically invites us to progress from technical-practical reason, of the subject as a being of nature, to moral-practical reason, of the subject as a person and from thinking of our own person we must progress to thinking of the pure being of understanding: God. This is the maximum proof of wisdom which the human being can cultivate, according to the last Kantian notations. Being a vital problem for man, it does not only include the theoretical aspect represented by the principle, but also includes both the worries we face about the impossibility to ascend beyond the principle and the feelings generated by our state of helplessness. They could give us an impulse to reflect, to find corresponding solutions to the philosophical concept of wisdom. Realizing these feelings, Kant affirms that: "It is a certain suffering in the feelings which accompany the sublimity of the ideas of pure practical reason and at the same time a *humility* to get to the feet of its object – but also an elevation of the one who is brave in decision"⁵². Or, in other words, sublimity, humility and elevation develop with the principles of moral-practical reason, which prescribe the right of man as a pure object of reason and make objective the subjective determining grounds. The

⁵¹ *OP*, AA, 22: 54.

⁵² *OP*, AA, 22: 53.

teaching we learn from this is that to consider God as a being in idea is, for man, a proof of wisdom. And the subject who makes the decision to elevate and enjoy wisdom must contribute, with all the faculties of his rational-sensible being, to this purpose.

The transcendental ideal and the human action. In his attempts to grasp the pure being of understanding, Kant proposes that we progress towards him not only with Christian concepts derived from perfection, which are highlighted by reason, but also through the critical concept of the transcendental ideal. In comparison with the concepts derived from perfection, the transcendental ideal sends directly to the determination of action, to the subject of the imperative, which belongs to moral-practical reason, and identifies with God.⁵³ Kant, in the *Critique of Pure Reason*, attributed absolute necessity⁵⁴ to this concept. Based on this, it is stated that a concept, such as the concept of God, only exist in a state of purity and is intended to the rationally ground existing ones; it is necessarily met with everything that exists and is considered “the supreme material and complete condition” of the possibility of the existing ones. As a consequence, any thinking about objects in general, according to their content, should be reduced to this supreme condition.⁵⁵ Once it is admitted, one can progress to the cognition of what individuals, objects or particular actions represent, proceeding to their general determination. It is worth mentioning that although the critical concept of the transcendental ideal is based on Christian concepts derived from perfection, these concepts are, nevertheless, not the ones who set human action in motion, but only prepare for it. Compared to them, Kant presents the transcendental ideal as the key to understanding human action. As a result of thinking about this topic, we realize that in man there is an active principle, which accompanies him like a spirit, and has a formative role. Regarding this, Kant affirms, in a general way, that: “In him (in the thinking moral man according the the comands of duty to ourselves) we live (*sentimus*) move (*agimus*) and we are (*existimus*)”⁵⁶. Under circumstances in which man is part and creator of the paradigm, having God in himself and in front of him, the tasks of the two entities, divided into three (the world divided into nature and man, whose rationality is expressly mentioned), are distributed as follows: “the nature acts (*agit*) the Man *is doing* (*facit*) the rational Subject acting with the consciousness of the purpose accomplish (*operatur*) An intelligent cause unopened to senses *directs* (*dirigit*)”⁵⁷. Initially nature and man – appeared from the division of the concept of world – act independently, and their reciprocity begins together with the pursuing of certain purposes. The consciousness of purpose makes

⁵³ *OP*, AA, 22: 55.

⁵⁴ *KrV*, AA, 3: 640: “entweder zu der absoluten Nothwendigkeit einen Begriff, oder zu dem Begriffe von irgend einem Dinge die absolute Nothwendigkeit desselben zu finden”.

⁵⁵ *KrV*, AA, 3: 604.

⁵⁶ *OP*, AA, 22: 55.

⁵⁷ *OP*, AA, 21: 18.

manifest the superior activity, which is their fulfillment in the world, from which their independence follows. With regards to reason this goes even further; through reason, laws, which address the moral-practical reason (*dictamina rationis practicae*), achievable through freedom, become known. Their seat is in reason, which differentiates them from the products of nature, which exist in space and time. And with reason one can take a step forward, towards the intelligent cause. When Kant affirms that in myself there is a being different to myself, who acts upon me (*agit, facit, operatur*) in the causal relation of efficiency, as a *nexus effectivus*, he refers to this intelligent cause, which does not aim at senses, and provides me with guidance in the world: it “directs” me. As the intelligent cause directs me, I am constrained to act within the limits of its project, which is rational. At the same time, the intelligent cause, being free and independent of the law of nature in space and time, leads and penalizes me inside by justification or condemnation. This cause is not a substance outside of me, and the causality of acting according to it does not stem from the necessity of nature, it is a determination of the fact in freedom. Within the limits of empirical knowledge, human practical actions, characterized as finite, can be achieved. Or, in order to be considered free actions, the *factum* of the categorical imperative must be activated, followed by the relationship of the imperative with the will and human freedom; an imperative which enjoys infinity, because it is *as if* it stems from the divine will, which is infinite; the world, and the free will of the rational being in the world, are also infinite. Or freedom is only potentially included in the categorical imperative, while its actualization passes beyond all explanatory grounds that exist in nature. Exceeding these natural grounds, all human duties are considered superhuman commands, that is, divine. However, it is not as if it should be presumed that a particular person is a promulgator of laws, but they exist in the moral-practical reason which exists in man, a reason which arrogates the right to command categorical, as if a real person would be in the imperative and not a person in the idea. This ‘person in the idea’ is the key to unifying of the concept of pure will with the impure concept of the world, and it also indicates the direction of practical actions, to be integrated in the system of knowledge. As we realize the importance of the divine person in relation to the world and human action, we also realize, at the same time, the necessity of transformation of the three transcendental critical ideas in the paradigm God-world of the *Opus Postumum*. As a result of this transformation has been achieved, at the same time, the accord of the concept of free will, necessary to action and its connection with God, with the concept of the world; a world which is the totality of the existence in space and time, in which an empirical knowledge is possible, whereas the pure will is a practical non-empirical faculty.

God and the beings of the world. At the end of the *Opus Postumum*, Kant shows us that to better understand the paradigm God-world, an exclusive reliance on the two beings who make up this paradigm, and which satisfy the concept of

philosophy through wisdom, is not sufficient. Consequently, Kant takes into consideration all the beings of the world, which he divides in four categories, according to the ways in which they enjoy the quality of a person, as a condition of wisdom. Every being of them is unique in its species. The first category is represented by God; the only being who has rights and no duty and, for this reason, He is identified with the moral-practical reason, with its laws and principles. He is thought of as an all-powerful being (*ens summum*), omniscient (*summa intelligentia*) and the sum total of goodness (*summum bonum*). The expression “tautologically strengthened of an alive God”⁵⁸, adds to these qualities and traces the personality of this being. The indication that God is designed as an ‘alive’ person, despite His rational origin, might surprise us, if it were not for the above mentioned, maximum attributes, through which it gains reality and, subsequently through reality, the possibility of being named ‘alive’. In this respect, Kant would attempt to overcome the solution presented in the *Critique of Pure Reason*; although, like other theoretical and practical themes dealt with in the *Opus Postumum*, he remains only at explorations and variants, which keep the critical frame optimal. Through the activity of the divine person, he can be associated with technical-practical reason but, as belonging, it is moral-practical reason. Owing to moral-practical reason, he is a being who can oblige, without being obligated. In contrast with him, the human person gains personality, based on the position of being obligated and needing to oblige; this relationship defines his moral profile, giving him responsibilities. For this reason, human personality is *stricto sensu* real, it receives and, at the same time, offers. The personality of God alone stems only from His unlimited rights, His is a rational personality, which receives actions as good facts⁵⁹. The opposite of the divine being is the human devoid of rights, exclusively to whom duties are associated. Kant designates by this deficient being the criminal⁶⁰. All he has left to do is to expiate his guilt. Thus, he must, through essential actions, duties, restore his original connection with the divinity. However, wisdom, for such an individual, is out of the question, given that his actions are, expressly contrary to duty and, implicitly, to divine command, which is the key to wisdom. For such beings, Kant

⁵⁸ *OP*, AA, 22: 48: “Unter dem Begriffe von Gott denkt man sich eine Substanz die allen Zwecken mit Bewusstseyn angemessen, d. i. eine Person wobey der tautologisch verstärkte Ausdruck der lebendige Gott [...]”.

⁵⁹ *OP*, AA, 22: 48. Due to this difference, on the personality of the divinity Kant has sometimes reservations, despite the fact that he disposes of the basis of this concept; respectively, he is a person with moral exceptional qualities, who excels in rights.

⁶⁰ *OP*, AA, 22: 49. Attila Ataner states that the legislator or the general will shall take into consideration the fact that the criminal, being endowed with innate personality, the capital punishment is, for him, irrational from a juridical perspective: “The forfeiture of his civil personality deprives the criminal of a voice in legislation, i.e., that criminals having been severed from the original contract, their *external* freedom need not figure in the operation of practical reason in its ordering of external relations among citizens” (Attila Ataner, “Kant on Capital Punishment and Suicide”, in *Kant-Studien*, 97, no. 4, 2006, pp. 451–482, p. 475).

split reason into a moral-practical and a technical-practical reason, the last being more permissive. Among the other three categories of beings in the world, who are relatively diverse given their practical faculties, man is the prototype being in the part of the paradigm represented by the world, because he both has rights and duties and is aware of them. Due to his endowment, he has moral and practical control over other beings. If on duties figures out only human interiority through consciousness, the institutions answer for his rights, institutions which also belong to the prototype of man and are intended to model his excesses. Such a person, who chooses the imperative and who can progress towards the pure being of understanding, is said to be free, but, at the same time, he is subject to laws, which he submits to (*dictamina rationis purae*), because laws exercise their divine commands over him. In comparison to the inevitable reference of the human being to laws, the divine being only obeys laws of reason, because the concept of a divine being contains particular rights and no duty, since God is a being of reason, when compared to the human being, whose sensibility must be limited by duties. The world, in which human action takes place, is the contrary to the being who accomplishes action; it has neither rights, nor duties. However, it is the totality of the sensible beings which makes up the world, and which must have duties, because they are beings who summon up both rationality and sensibility, and consequently, their weak attribute, sensibility, must be attracted to the stronger attribute of reason. And, in this way, the sensible-rational being ends up being both attracted to and strengthened by the duties imposed by the divine being. His idealness, in relation to the concepts of the rational subject, puts the divine being in the seat of commands of duty. As far as the world's beings refer to this seat, they have equal rights and duties and are defined as persons. Under the position of the human being are the subhuman beings, who have neither rights, no duties, because they have no desires. Having no desires, according to which they act, they have neither rights nor duties to regulate them and through which to entertain a relationship with the divine being. This lack of desire deprives them of purpose and thus they are not able to accomplish, but only exist. They are human beings, but deprived of participation in social existence (*gemeine Wesen*). Next to them are those beings who have desires, but no will to satisfy them. And to these beings, acting is deficient, a deficiency that affects legal-moral regulation. Kant does not further determine beings of the last two classes. We deduce, however, that they do not refer to animals, but to the deficient human being, not included in the community. The inferior cognitive capacities of this fraction of humanity makes them unable to participate in human cognition; and the same goes for their practical capacities, which highlights the first ones. And, among these beings, wisdom reflected in actions is especially deficient. They are disfavoured in relation to man, because of the absence of both the faculty which enables the connection with God to be entertained, *mens*, and free will. This faculty cannot be expected in God to be given to man, who is God's closest collaborator and his reflex in the world. If we

believe that, by the attribute of maximum goodness which God makes use of, any will could change in a good will, then the essence of this concept, self-determination, would be affected. It follows that God did not create subhuman beings to be equal to man, who is able to entertain a relationship with God through duty, but to serve the needs of perfectible man, the prototype man and to complete the system; a system which does not constitute a nature in a general way, as a whole to which God is also attracted, but, at the same time, it constitutes a system of thinking, which re-sets transcendental philosophy in his final pattern. If the system is extended upwards with God, it is, at the same time, extended downwards, with subhuman beings and animals. Since they are endowed with lower capacities than human beings, their contribution to cognition is indirect, to better mark the limits of the human and of his subjective creativity, constitutive to his system. About these beings Kant states: “The animals seem to be *made* by God, because in them there is a *spiritus* and also *anima (imateriale)* but not *mens* as a free will”⁶¹. This is how it appears “the absolute whole”, projected by Kant for his system of transcendental philosophy. It comprises all we can perceive with our senses, but also what we cannot see, only think, with our capacities that are subordinated to reason. It also shows us the way in which we can act to satisfy the extremes of this system, which are comprised of God and man. This is the maximum degree of wisdom, named in the *Opus Postumum sapientia*. It was possible due to the reorientation of the system. As a result of the change in orientation, the three transcendental ideas, which satisfied the critical purpose of metaphysics, have been replaced with the paradigm of the God-world, to serve the final purpose of the system, which is one of preparation of the practical action, initiated in the *Metaphysics of Morals*.

⁶¹ *OP*, AA, 21: 34.

