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I.F.P.A.R. RESEARCH SEMINARS (13 February 2025)
victorg, Sunday 09 February 2025 - 00:00:00 //
Thursday, 13 February 2025, 12:00–14:00
Speaker: KARIN DE BOER (Katholieke Universiteit Leuven)
Title: “Kant’s Metaphilosophical Conception of Transcendental Idealism”
- online -
Meeting invite link: https://meet.google.com/idm-boup-spy
*No registration required.
Speaker: KARIN DE BOER (Katholieke Universiteit Leuven)
Title: “Kant’s Metaphilosophical Conception of Transcendental Idealism”
- online -
Meeting invite link: https://meet.google.com/idm-boup-spy
*No registration required.
Abstract:
In The Bounds of Sense, Strawson considers the term ‘transcendental idealism’ to denote an untenable metaphysical theory about supersensible entities. His attempt to purge Kant’s Critique from this doctrine has led to increasingly sophisticated attempts to make sense of Kant’s apparently incongruous remarks on the thing in itself and related subjects. As is well known, Allison tried to change the premises of the debate in his Kant’s Transcendental Idealism by arguing that the term ‘transcendental idealism’ denotes a theory about epistemic conditions rather than reality. In this paper, I accept Allison’s criticism of the assumption that Kant intended to elaborate such a theory, but claim that he did not go far enough in dissociating Kant’s conception of transcendental idealism from the content of his analyses, regardless of whether they are about things or epistemic conditions. Contra Allison, I argue that Kant uses the term ‘transcendental idealism’ in a metaphilosophical sense, namely, to denote the very standpoint from which the inquiry into human cognition at stake in the Critique is undertaken. Once this perspective has been adopted, it is neither possible nor necessary to take into account the role of mind-independent things in the production of empirical cognitions.
In The Bounds of Sense, Strawson considers the term ‘transcendental idealism’ to denote an untenable metaphysical theory about supersensible entities. His attempt to purge Kant’s Critique from this doctrine has led to increasingly sophisticated attempts to make sense of Kant’s apparently incongruous remarks on the thing in itself and related subjects. As is well known, Allison tried to change the premises of the debate in his Kant’s Transcendental Idealism by arguing that the term ‘transcendental idealism’ denotes a theory about epistemic conditions rather than reality. In this paper, I accept Allison’s criticism of the assumption that Kant intended to elaborate such a theory, but claim that he did not go far enough in dissociating Kant’s conception of transcendental idealism from the content of his analyses, regardless of whether they are about things or epistemic conditions. Contra Allison, I argue that Kant uses the term ‘transcendental idealism’ in a metaphilosophical sense, namely, to denote the very standpoint from which the inquiry into human cognition at stake in the Critique is undertaken. Once this perspective has been adopted, it is neither possible nor necessary to take into account the role of mind-independent things in the production of empirical cognitions.
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cu toate drepturile rezervate. Utilizarea materialelor apărute în conținutul sitului este permisă numai în scop educativ sau orientativ pentru cercetare academică,
cu condiția respectării drepturilor de autor si a drepturilor de proprietate intelectuala stabilite prin legislația în vigoare.
Site acţionat cu cms e107, realizat sub termenii Licenţei GNU GPL.