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I.F.P.A.R. RESEARCH SEMINARS (24 October 2024)
victorg, Sunday 20 October 2024 - 00:00:00 //
Thursday, 24 October 2024
(Bucharest time 16:00–18:00; New Jersey time 9:00–11.00)
– online –
Speaker: Professor DANIEL GARBER (Princeton University)
Title: ”Spinoza’s Anti-Cogito”
(Bucharest time 16:00–18:00; New Jersey time 9:00–11.00)
– online –
Speaker: Professor DANIEL GARBER (Princeton University)
Title: ”Spinoza’s Anti-Cogito”
Meeting invite link: https://meet.google.com/idm-boup-spy
No registration required.
No registration required.
Abstract:
Spinoza certainly knew of Descartes’ cogito and his argument for the immediate awareness of the self. It is tempting to believe that Spinoza, like many of his contemporaries, appreciated the necessity of recognizing a subject of thoughts and affects, a me of which I am aware. But I will argue that while Spinoza does recognize a self of which we are conscious, that self and our consciousness of it are not at all like what Descartes advanced, a direct and intuitive grasp of myself, open to me at the beginning of philosophizing. I will argue that while Spinoza thinks that we are, indeed, conscious of ourselves, what we are conscious of is very different from the Cartesian subject and how we are conscious of it is very different from the direct knowledge we gain of the self from the cogito.
Spinoza certainly knew of Descartes’ cogito and his argument for the immediate awareness of the self. It is tempting to believe that Spinoza, like many of his contemporaries, appreciated the necessity of recognizing a subject of thoughts and affects, a me of which I am aware. But I will argue that while Spinoza does recognize a self of which we are conscious, that self and our consciousness of it are not at all like what Descartes advanced, a direct and intuitive grasp of myself, open to me at the beginning of philosophizing. I will argue that while Spinoza thinks that we are, indeed, conscious of ourselves, what we are conscious of is very different from the Cartesian subject and how we are conscious of it is very different from the direct knowledge we gain of the self from the cogito.
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cu toate drepturile rezervate. Utilizarea materialelor apărute în conținutul sitului este permisă numai în scop educativ sau orientativ pentru cercetare academică,
cu condiția respectării drepturilor de autor si a drepturilor de proprietate intelectuala stabilite prin legislația în vigoare.
Site acţionat cu cms e107, realizat sub termenii Licenţei GNU GPL.